There is now a ‘collective Putin’ in the Kremlin

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The author is an FT Contributing Editor, President of the Center for Liberal Strategies, SOFIA and Fellow at IWM Vienna.

It was an unforgettable political spectacle. On 21 February 2022, on the eve of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin chaired a televised meeting of Russia’s National Security Council. He asked the council members to declare whether they are in favor of Moscow recognizing the independence of the Donbass separatist republics.

The stage-driven event gave the impression of a lonely, paranoid king who disdained his senior advisors. They are scared of him while trying their best to please him. He humiliates them only for his pleasure.

The Kremlin’s reaction to the recent rebellion of Wagner’s mercenary Yevgeny Prigozhin forces us to reconsider this picture. It was not Putin but the “collective Putin” (an enigmatic figure including, among others, Belarus’ dictator Alexander Lukashenko) who decided the outcome of the crisis. A man named Putin was enraged and humiliated by Wagner’s betrayal and went on TV threatening to “get tough”. But “collective Putin” concluded that it would be wiser to negotiate with the rebels and find an exit strategy. We now know that Putin met with Prigozhin and other Wagner commanders on 29 June. For someone obsessed with treason and betrayal, this was a bitter pill to swallow.

what changed? Mainly, the relationship between Putin and the Russian elite. Now he is not afraid of them as much as they are afraid of him. He is less afraid of their exit than of their voice. Many of his closest associates blame him personally for the current situation. It was Putin’s decision to promote competition between Wagner and the Ministry of Defense that ultimately led to Wagner’s march to Moscow.

Prigozhin’s rebellion has exposed a central paradox of Putin’s personnel politics. To win the war, Putin needs ambitious, ruthless leaders like Wagner’s boss. However, to secure his power and guarantee elite unity, he needs to rely on non-charismatic figures such as Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov. The fear of the “Zhukov effect” – the emergence of a popular general like Georgy Zhukov, the Soviet commander who occupied Nazi Berlin – explains why Prigozhin had to leave. The public may see such a person as an alternative to Putin.

The secret of colonial wars is that they can only be successful if people forget about them. Putin’s war is no different. His insistence that the fighting in Ukraine is a special military operation, not an actual war, was an attempt to assure Russians that in a time when everything has changed, nothing has really changed in their lives. Wagner’s mercenaries break through the facade of mediocrity that is so important to the Kremlin. Protecting living standards is no longer enough to convince Russians that they have nothing to worry about.

All coups begin with a plot. The failed coup ends in paranoia. Therefore, it is logical to expect dramatic changes at the top in the Kremlin. But these expectations can also be wrong. A purge at the lower levels of the security services is inevitable, but it is unclear whether the Kremlin will risk change at higher levels.

In the first year of the war in Ukraine, changes at the top of the pecking order in Moscow were surprisingly limited. And while wars typically bring to power ambitious and often ruthless leaders who have proven themselves in battle, only two groups have risen in Putin’s hierarchy since February 2022. These are the sons of Putin’s old friends and his assistants – in short, those considered loyal and known to the leader personally.

Stability has trumped the need for more effective leadership. Now, after the Wagner mutiny, Putin faces a difficult choice. He can hardly dismiss Russia’s military leadership without admitting that Prigozhin was right. But with this leadership, he can hardly win the war. The Wagner Rebellion has strengthened the “collective Putin”.

The differing perceptions of the rebellion inside and outside Russia highlight its unintended consequences. While most Russians were horrified at the prospect of civil war and Prigozhin’s approval rating has plummeted, the new consensus in the West is that a change of power in Russia is an opportunity, as far as any leader other than Putin goes – regardless of their Whatever the political views – the war would be more likely to stop.

It would be wishful thinking to see Prigozhin’s march on Moscow as a harbinger of the end of Putin’s rule. It would also be a mistake to ignore its importance. This indicates that there has been a transfer of power from Putin the king to Putin the collective.