Why would NATO have to grow at the pace of the US?

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“It’s really important to keep NATO together,” says Joe Biden. But the unity of NATO’s 31 members will be their biggest test since the start of the Ukraine war at the organization’s summit in Lithuania this week.

The issue that threatens to split the coalition is Ukraine’s ambition to join it. One camp, which also includes Poland, the Baltic states and Ukraine itself, wants to see the country move faster towards NATO membership. The second, led by the US and supported by Germany, seeks to slow down the process and promote other forms of security guarantees for Ukraine.

Skilled diplomats will probably find a form of words that will paper over these cracks. Final NATO communiques are likely to emphasize that Ukraine will join the alliance in the future, but avoid any pledges to speed up the process.

However, this would not be the end of the matter. Behind this argument are fundamental differences over how to end the Ukraine war and how to guarantee peace after the war is over.

The hardline camp believes the goal should be a complete victory for Ukraine and a humiliating defeat for Russia. He believes that the only way to ensure peace is to break Russian power and then bring Ukraine into NATO. They believe that Kiev has already paid a heavy price for excessive American and German caution in arms deliveries – and the Americans are now repeating the mistake by dragging their feet on future Ukrainian membership of the alliance.

The American and German governments are more careful about both the aims of the war and the protection of the peace. A senior German diplomat believes that behind Poland’s talk about the need for the complete defeat of Vladimir Putin is the hope that Russia can finally break through. He says it is an idea that has no interest in Berlin.

The Americans are not saying that Ukraine can never join NATO. But they are slowly applying the brakes by insisting that every technical requirement must be met first. When angry hardliners cite Finland’s recent rapid joining of the coalition as an example, the US response is that Finland, as a member of the European Union, has already implemented anti-corruption measures, democratic governance and All such requirements have been met.

Behind the formal US objections is concern that any commitment to rapidly include Ukraine in NATO could prolong the war, and create dangerous complications in any future peace deal. For example, would Crimea be covered by NATO security guarantees for Ukraine? Some US officials also worry that some allies would actually like to see NATO engage directly in war with Russia. “If they want to, they should say so,” says a prominent Washingtonian, “because that is not our policy.”

Now instead of putting pressure on NATO, the US is pushing for alternative forms of security guarantees. The idea would be to establish a unique military partnership with Ukraine that would include high-tech arms transfers and intensive military-to-military cooperation. A US official says the plan is to create a “defense-oriented force that will present a very difficult target for any future Russian aggression”. Biden and others have compared to This is for America’s relationship with Israel. Like the Israelis, the Ukrainians will be a close US ally, equipped with the most advanced military equipment – including controversially cluster munitions. But crucially, Ukraine, like Israel, will not, initially, fall under NATO’s Article V security guarantees.

All this talk of alternative security guarantees worries some of Ukraine’s most ardent supporters in NATO. Last week, Kaja Kailas, the Estonian prime minister, put her frustrations on record when she told the FT: “We need practical, concrete steps on the path to NATO membership. I think that talking about security guarantees really helps . . . the only security guarantee that really works . . . is NATO membership.”

It is easy to sympathize with Callas’ view that ambiguity is dangerous and that “gray zones are sources of conflict and war”. Ukraine would certainly be safer inside NATO and experience shows that Russia would be less likely to attack an Article V country.

But the reality is that the American point of view has to prevail. america counts about 70 percent of the total defense spending of all NATO countries. So NATO policy will ultimately be decided in Washington, not Brussels or Vilnius.

There are also good political and financial reasons for NATO being guided by America’s relative caution. A Biden White House will likely be the most Ukraine- and NATO-friendly administration the US can currently form. The Republicans are the party of Donald Trump, not the late John McCain. Any move to rapidly integrate Ukraine into NATO could easily become an issue in the US presidential election. Senate ratification of the Ukrainian membership would not be guaranteed.

Behind these political facts is hidden a wider historical reality. NATO came into existence in 1949 after the Second World War and at the beginning of the Cold War. American politicians who built the coalition had an intellectual and emotional commitment to the defense of Europe that could no longer be taken for granted in Washington. For all their frustrations with the Biden administration, furious Europeans should remember this.

gideon.rachman@ft.com