‘He went mad’: how Putin’s caterer served a dish of blatant treason

When they first surfaced to fight in secret in Ukraine in 2014, the masked fighters of Russia’s Wagner Group became a symbol of how Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin has mastered a new, covert form of warfare. Lee is

But as Wagner paramilitaries captured at least one Russian city on Saturday and began a “march of justice” on Moscow, the shockwaves of the nine-year war in Ukraine threaten the foundations of Putin’s state — his own. With the problem created by

After months of fractious public fighting, the conflict between Yevgeny Prigozhin’s paramilitary forces and the Russian Defense Ministry has turned into the first coup attempt in Russia in three decades.

Although Putin appeared unfazed by his former caterer Prigozhin’s “treason” during a stern five-minute address to the nation, the chaos signaled how years of secret warfare, bad governance and corruption have taken their toll on his rule in 24 years. posed a threat.

“They should never have fought with (private militia) during the war. Using anything but the military was a mistake, said a former senior Kremlin official. “It is good to do this during peacetime, but now you cannot do it. That’s why this story happened with Prigozhin – (Putin) brought it upon himself.”

Prigozhin’s rebellion has its roots in 2014 when Prigozhin set up Wagner for Russia to hide its involvement in the slow-moving war in Ukraine’s eastern Donbass region. The group helped keep eastern Ukraine under Russian proxy control and, as its mission expanded, facilitated Russia’s possible refusal to fly to Syria and Mozambique.

But despite all its apparent independence—the Kremlin claimed to know nothing about it, while Prigozhin denied for years that the group even existed—Wagner was a big part of Russia’s official war machine.

Initially run by the GRU, the Russian military intelligence, Wagner was funded largely from the national defense budget and often competed with the armed forces for lucrative contracts, according to people close to the Kremlin and security sources in the West.

The people said it fueled a rivalry that began years before Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, heated up during a bloody siege of the city of Bakhmut this winter and spiraled out of control this week.

“The main reason why Prigozhin happened is Russia. , , Could not form an effective army. Instead they had to create an ersatz army, and it was clear from the outset that there are huge risks in creating a parallel army,” said Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow-based defense think-tank Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

According to analysts and those close to the Kremlin, as it assumed a dominant role on the front lines and its feud with the military deepened, Wagner became a kind of Frankenstein’s monster that eventually attacked its creator.

Prigozhin, who has known Putin since the future president visited his restaurant in St. Petersburg in the 1990s, has sharply criticized the military, leading many in Moscow to suspect that he has Putin’s approval. Is.

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Wagner’s forces were largely drawn from defectors after Putin personally signed thousands of pardons.

Furthermore, as one of the few members of Russia’s elite who were not privately intimidated by the war, Prigozhin’s militancy helped him to emerge as a radical political figure.

He urged Putin to adopt a “total war” position along the lines of North Korea, revealed an assassination by Wagner militiamen with a sledgehammer, and sent a replica of the weapon to a senior lawmaker so he could pose with it Can

His rise alarmed many of Moscow’s elite, who feared he would be used to defeat him for supporting the war effort or confiscate his wealth with Putin’s support.

That reliance appears to have lulled Putin into a false sense of security. According to Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, this led him to believe that he could allow Wagner to weaken him by keeping the Ministry of Defense under control.

“They thought that Prigozhin had become isolated. They don’t have any party, they don’t hold rallies, so they don’t exist. Putin doesn’t understand what the Internet is, so he didn’t know that Prigozhin was more effective online than him or the war or anything else,” Stanovaya said.

“He thought that Prigozhin was completely dependent and (…) he could be overthrown in a second if need be.”

The exact circumstances of the rebellion remain unclear. A person close to the FSB said that Russian security forces had been preparing for some kind of attack for several days, suggesting that Prigozhin knew about the plan and decided to go all guns blazing Was. The person said, “It has not happened suddenly and it is not surprising.”

Another former senior Kremlin official said the conflict with the military had driven Prigozhin – a former criminal who is said to have enjoyed publicly executing fugitives – to even greater extremes. Was.

“He got mad, got angry and went too far. They added too much salt and pepper,” the former official said. “What else do you expect from a chef?”

A significant reason for Prigozhin’s mutiny appears to have been Putin’s decision to support the Defense Ministry’s efforts to bring Wagner to power.

After Russia’s capture of Bakhmut the previous month, Wagner’s forces withdrew from the front line, leaving Prigozhin to wonder whether he would return. Then, Putin supported Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s effort to bring the militias fighting in Ukraine under military control.

Pukhov said, “He was pushed to the side when he realized he was being pushed into a corner, that he was losing power and control over Wagner.” “He just didn’t want to sink into oblivion.”

Prigozhin’s tremendous rise as a public figure appears to have fueled deep resentment at being asked to take command, as well as personal grudges against Shoigu and the commander of Russia’s invasion force, Valery Gerasimov.

Stanovaya said that the war had brutalized Prigozhin, who recorded numerous attacks in front of corpses on the battlefield and blamed Shoigu for their deaths, to the extent that he lost his place in Russia’s hierarchy. Was.

“This is a man who spent months during the war looking at severed limbs and severed heads. He doesn’t think about red lines, how (Kremlin) thinks about it and so on,” he said. “He thinks he is entitled to privilege and not even Putin can do anything about it.”

In his speech on Saturday, Putin appeared to belatedly realizing the danger Wagner posed to the state. He compared it to the collapse of the Russian Empire in the Revolution of 1917, which he said ended in “a colossal collapse, the destruction of the army and the collapse of the state, the loss of vast territories and, finally, tragedy”. of civil war

Pukhov said, as Wagner’s army moved north toward Moscow, Russia’s belief that it could defeat Ukraine and the West in a protracted war proved to be a “dangerous illusion”.

“There are huge domestic risks for Russia by dragging out the war. The first destabilizing blow came earlier than he expected. Now the risk is going to increase further.

When they first surfaced to fight in secret in Ukraine in 2014, the masked fighters of Russia’s Wagner Group became a symbol of how Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin has mastered a new, covert form of warfare. Lee is

But as Wagner paramilitaries captured at least one Russian city on Saturday and began a “march of justice” on Moscow, the shockwaves of the nine-year war in Ukraine threaten the foundations of Putin’s state — his own. With the problem created by

After months of fractious public fighting, the conflict between Yevgeny Prigozhin’s paramilitary forces and the Russian Defense Ministry has turned into the first coup attempt in Russia in three decades.

Although Putin appeared unfazed by his former caterer Prigozhin’s “treason” during a stern five-minute address to the nation, the chaos signaled how years of secret warfare, bad governance and corruption have taken their toll on his rule in 24 years. posed a threat.

“They should never have fought with (private militia) during the war. Using anything but the military was a mistake, said a former senior Kremlin official. “It is good to do this during peacetime, but now you cannot do it. That’s why this story happened with Prigozhin – (Putin) brought it upon himself.”

Prigozhin’s rebellion has its roots in 2014 when Prigozhin set up Wagner for Russia to hide its involvement in the slow-moving war in Ukraine’s eastern Donbass region. The group helped keep eastern Ukraine under Russian proxy control and, as its mission expanded, facilitated Russia’s possible refusal to fly to Syria and Mozambique.

But despite all its apparent independence—the Kremlin claimed to know nothing about it, while Prigozhin denied for years that the group even existed—Wagner was a big part of Russia’s official war machine.

Initially run by the GRU, the Russian military intelligence, Wagner was funded largely from the national defense budget and often competed with the armed forces for lucrative contracts, according to people close to the Kremlin and security sources in the West.

The people said it fueled a rivalry that began years before Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, heated up during a bloody siege of the city of Bakhmut this winter and spiraled out of control this week.

“The main reason why Prigozhin happened is Russia. , , Could not form an effective army. Instead they had to create an ersatz army, and it was clear from the outset that there are huge risks in creating a parallel army,” said Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow-based defense think-tank Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

According to analysts and those close to the Kremlin, as it assumed a dominant role on the front lines and its feud with the military deepened, Wagner became a kind of Frankenstein’s monster that eventually attacked its creator.

Prigozhin, who has known Putin since the future president visited his restaurant in St. Petersburg in the 1990s, has sharply criticized the military, leading many in Moscow to suspect that he has Putin’s approval. Is.

You are viewing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is probably due to being offline or JavaScript is disabled in your browser.

Wagner’s forces were largely drawn from defectors after Putin personally signed thousands of pardons.

Furthermore, as one of the few members of Russia’s elite who were not privately intimidated by the war, Prigozhin’s militancy helped him to emerge as a radical political figure.

He urged Putin to adopt a “total war” position along the lines of North Korea, revealed an assassination by Wagner militiamen with a sledgehammer, and sent a replica of the weapon to a senior lawmaker so he could pose with it Can

His rise alarmed many of Moscow’s elite, who feared he would be used to defeat him for supporting the war effort or confiscate his wealth with Putin’s support.

That reliance appears to have lulled Putin into a false sense of security. According to Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, this led him to believe that he could allow Wagner to weaken him by keeping the Ministry of Defense under control.

“They thought that Prigozhin had become isolated. They don’t have any party, they don’t hold rallies, so they don’t exist. Putin doesn’t understand what the Internet is, so he didn’t know that Prigozhin was more effective online than him or the war or anything else,” Stanovaya said.

“He thought that Prigozhin was completely dependent and (…) he could be overthrown in a second if need be.”

The exact circumstances of the rebellion remain unclear. A person close to the FSB said that Russian security forces had been preparing for some kind of attack for several days, suggesting that Prigozhin knew about the plan and decided to go all guns blazing Was. The person said, “It has not happened suddenly and it is not surprising.”

Another former senior Kremlin official said the conflict with the military had driven Prigozhin – a former criminal who is said to have enjoyed publicly executing fugitives – to even greater extremes. Was.

“He got mad, got angry and went too far. They added too much salt and pepper,” the former official said. “What else do you expect from a chef?”

A significant reason for Prigozhin’s mutiny appears to have been Putin’s decision to support the Defense Ministry’s efforts to bring Wagner to power.

After Russia’s capture of Bakhmut the previous month, Wagner’s forces withdrew from the front line, leaving Prigozhin to wonder whether he would return. Then, Putin supported Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s effort to bring the militias fighting in Ukraine under military control.

Pukhov said, “He was pushed to the side when he realized he was being pushed into a corner, that he was losing power and control over Wagner.” “He just didn’t want to sink into oblivion.”

Prigozhin’s tremendous rise as a public figure appears to have fueled deep resentment at being asked to take command, as well as personal grudges against Shoigu and the commander of Russia’s invasion force, Valery Gerasimov.

Stanovaya said that the war had brutalized Prigozhin, who recorded numerous attacks in front of corpses on the battlefield and blamed Shoigu for their deaths, to the extent that he lost his place in Russia’s hierarchy. Was.

“This is a man who spent months during the war looking at severed limbs and severed heads. He doesn’t think about red lines, how (Kremlin) thinks about it and so on,” he said. “He thinks he is entitled to privilege and not even Putin can do anything about it.”

In his speech on Saturday, Putin appeared to belatedly realizing the danger Wagner posed to the state. He compared it to the collapse of the Russian Empire in the Revolution of 1917, which he said ended in “a colossal collapse, the destruction of the army and the collapse of the state, the loss of vast territories and, finally, tragedy”. of civil war

Pukhov said, as Wagner’s army moved north toward Moscow, Russia’s belief that it could defeat Ukraine and the West in a protracted war proved to be a “dangerous illusion”.

“There are huge domestic risks for Russia by dragging out the war. The first destabilizing blow came earlier than he expected. Now the risk is going to increase further.