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Fifteen months ago, Vladimir Putin’s army was on the outskirts of Kiev. Now Russian leaders are struggling to maintain control in Moscow.
The mutiny of the Wagner forces, led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, is the final confirmation of how disastrous this war has proved for Putin. Even if the Russian leader wins in the immediate battle against Wagner, it’s hard to believe that Putin would ultimately be able to get away with such humiliation. His reputation, his power, even his life is now in danger.
The historical irony is that Putin’s own actions have led to what he fears most: an insurgency that threatens both the Russian state and his own personal power.
Putin’s fear of a “color revolution” in Russia is almost 20 years old. Well, it has its origins in Ukraine. The 2004 Orange Revolution – a popular, democratic uprising against rigged elections in Ukraine – sparked a disenchantment in the Russian presidency that has steadily intensified over the past few years.
Since then, Putin has been haunted by two connected fears. First, Ukraine will slip out of Russia’s grasp forever. Second, the successful pro-democracy uprising in Kiev would foreshadow the same thing in Moscow.
His decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 was an attempt to finally eliminate both threats – by installing a pro-Russian, authoritarian government in Kiev.
As a former intelligence operative and conspiracy theorist, Putin was convinced that any “color revolution” – whether in Ukraine or Russia – would have its origins in Washington. His refusal to acknowledge that Ukrainians could have agency or power led to his fatal underestimation of the strength of the country’s resistance to Russian aggression.
In addition to underestimating Ukrainian strength, Putin – intoxicated by the mythology of the Red Army of the 1940s – also overestimated Russia’s own military might. The failure of the Russian army opened the door for the Wagner group to enter the war. This gave Prigozhin his power base and propaganda platform, and eventually allowed him to attack the Russian state.
To the Russian people, Putin has always said that he saved the country from the chaos of the 1990s. But what is happening now is reminiscent of the failed military and radical coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, when Boris Yeltsin rammed a tank outside parliament. At that time, the people of Moscow played an important role in the unfolding events. The reaction of the Russian populace to the Prigozhin rebellion would be an important – and, as yet, unknown – part of this story.
In his first remarks on the Prigozhin rebellion, Putin looked to an even darker precedent: the alleged “stab in the back” that ended the Russian war effort in 1917 and pushed the country into revolution and civil war. These words were meant to convey the firmness of purpose. But they were hardly convinced.
The Wagner Rebellion will give hope to opponents of the Putin regime – both inside and outside Russia. For the Ukrainian military, whose counteroffensive has failed, this looks like a historic opportunity. If Russian forces attack each other, or pull back from the front line to defend Putin, they could be confined to eastern Ukraine.
There should be a renewed sense of hope and opportunity in Russia, even among political prisoners like Alexey Navalny or Vladimir Kara-Murza. They too may play a role in the coming months.
Undoubtedly, Prigozhin is not a liberal. His rhetoric is deeply nationalistic and imperialist. The Wagner forces have a good reputation for brutality. But Prigozhin – like Putin – has now unleashed forces he will struggle to contain.
gideon.rachman@ft.com










